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ABSTRACT
Many school districts experience difficulties attracting and retaining teachers, and the impending
retirement of a substantial fraction of public school teachers raises the specter of severe shortages in some
public schools.  Schools in urban areas serving economically disadvantaged and minority students appear
particularly vulnerable. This paper investigates those factors that affect the probabilities that teachers
switch schools or exit the public schools entirely. The results indicate that teacher mobility is much more
strongly related to characteristics of the students, particularly race and achievement, than to salary,
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2While many more teachers are certified each year than are needed to fill vacancies, the pre-teaching phase is
important for consideration of some specialities such as the current shortages in advanced math and science, in
special education, and in bilingual education.  The policy discussions in these areas generally concentrate on
issues of overall salary levels and of requirements for certification (e.g., Murnane et al., 1991; Hanushek and Pace,
1995).   
Why Public Schools Lose Teachers 
by Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin
Issues of teacher shortages have pervaded policy discussions for decades.  Although the exact
nature of the concerns – specific subjects such as math or science, recruiting difficulties in urban centers,
or elements of quality such as availability of fully certified teachers – has varied over time and across
locations, the perceived need to act has not.  In response, educators have offered a variety of
compensation policies designed to attract more teachers into the profession and to retain more of those
currently teaching. These include higher pay (typically across the board but sometimes targeted on
specific communities or subjects), forgiveness on student loans in exchange for a commitment to teach
(often in difficult to staff schools), and the expansion of alternative certification and housing reserved for
teachers but to name a few. The efficacy of any of these strategies depends crucially on the
responsiveness of supply, and, as we demonstrate below, must be evaluated in terms of other powerful
forces operating in teacher labor markets.
A basic impediment to the development of effective teacher labor market policies is the lack of a
comprehensive understanding of the determinants of teacher labor supply.  Teacher labor supply actually
aggregates a variety of decisions made at different points in time and based on different information and
influences.  With some variants, the pre-teaching phase begins with a decision to train for teaching and
with successful completion of teacher preparation and certification (or at least enough schooling to
qualify for an emergency license). It then moves to the application and job matching process. Having
been hired at a particular school, the career path is determined by the continuation and retention
decisions of both teachers and schools. This paper focuses on those who have already entered teaching
and considers the details of the supply decisions of current teachers.
2  Their transitions relate much more-2-
directly to the circumstances and policies of specific districts and their interaction with teacher
preferences.
A number of papers including Murnane and Olsen (1989, 1990) and Dolton and van der Klaauw
(1995, 1999) have examined the link between duration in teaching and pay. These studies generally find
that higher teacher pay reduces the probability that teachers leave the profession, particularly once
differences in alternative earnings opportunities are taken into consideration.
One potential problem for these studies is the limited amount of information on working
conditions that may be correlated with salary. While Murnane and Olsen attempt to account for
differences in working conditions by including demographic information on school districts from U.S.
Census data, the lack of direct information on public school students, availability of only a single year of
data on student characteristics and other limitations inhibit the analysis of these factors. Not only does
the lack of good information on student and school characteristics (such as class size) potentially bias the
estimated effects of salary, it also reduces the understanding of the association between student
characteristics and transitions.
We make use of matched student/teacher panel data on Texas public elementary schools to gain a
better understanding of the effects of salary and other school factors on teacher transitions. These data
permit a detailed description of student demographic and school characteristics and pre- and post-move
comparisons for teachers who switch schools within Texas or leave the Texas public schools. Given the
large number of teachers and teacher transitions in the data, we can divide teachers on the basis of
experience, school community type, ethnicity and other factors and examine differences in the
responsiveness to salary and student characteristics on the basis of teacher experience, race and ethnicity.
The results show that teacher transitions are much more strongly related to particular student
characteristics than to salary differentials. Schools serving large numbers of academically disadvantaged,
black or Hispanic students tend to lose a substantial fraction of teachers each year both to other districts     
1Fringe benefits are an important and growing share of compensation, and differences in the generosity of
benefits is certainly not perfectly correlated with salary differences. Unfortunately, we, like all past researchers, do
not have information on fringe benefits.
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and out of the Texas public schools entirely. An implication is that the supply curve faced by these
districts differs markedly from that faced by middle and upper middle class communities in which a far
lower proportion of teachers seek to improve their employment arrangement by switching to another
public school.
Determinants of the Supply of Teachers
The standard microeconomic framework for analyzing teacher supply and salaries would began
with individual labor supply decisions and aggregate these up to a market supply function.  The supply of
labor to district d within a geographical area j can be characterized by:
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where q
S is the supply of teachers for district d in area j; wd and WCd are wages and working conditions,
respectively, in district d; and Aj and Oj are amenities and other employment opportunities, respectively,
in area j. Consideration of each of these elements allows us to frame the analysis and to put previous
work into a more general context.
Salaries (wd).  A fundamentally important issue in the consideration of teacher labor markets is which
salary differences to look at and how they should be interpreted.
1  At any point in time, teacher wages
will vary within a district. These wage differences reflect different components of teacher salary
contracts involving experience, graduate education levels, and a variety of other factors.  Observing these
wage differences provides information about movements along a supply schedule, but it does not provide
information about what would happen if the entire salary schedule were shifted.  Much of the analysis of
achievement effects of salaries, for example, has considered differences in wages along a salary schedule     
2There has also been a substantial amount of discussion about the use of teacher pay as a direct  incentive for
better performance by individual teachers. See Cohen and Murnane (1986) and Hanushek et al (1994) for
discussions of merit pay. There is little evidence of systematic variation in salaries based on performance in Texas
schools, although a number of districts have considered such moves.
     
3We have focused on salaries of teachers without post-bacheloriate schooling, because only roughly one fourth
of Texas elementary school teachers possess a master’s degree.
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or combined movements along schedules with changes in the overall salary structure (Hanushek 1997),
while much of the policy debate focuses on the level of the entire salary schedule.
2 By constructing
annual salary schedules for single years of experience in each district over only teachers who do not have
a graduate degree, we can isolate the effects of both cross-sectional and inter-temporal variations in
overall salary levels.
3
Alternative Earnings Opportunities and Amenities(Oj ,Aj ).  It is long established that one must account
for differences in alternative opportunities for teachers.  This is clearest in consideration of differential
competition for specific teachers, say math and science teachers versus those in other specialities (e.g.,
Kershaw and McKean 1962; Zarkin 1985; Murnane et al., 1991).  It also comes into play in terms of
consideration of the districts that form the relevant decision set. If areas differ by prices or amenities or if
labor markets are geographically confined, salaries must be considered in comparison to the relevant
group of competing districts. This point, made by Chambers (1977) and Ferguson (1991), provides
information on the specification of the wage and compensation comparisons.  Important elements of the
overall market factors are also highlighted in Flyer and Rosen (1997) and Boardman, Darling-Hammond,
and Mullin (1982).
The empirical evidence supports the belief that alternative earnings opportunities affect teacher
labor supply. In a series of papers, Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995, 1999) and van der Klaaw (1997)
investigate the impact of alternative opportunities on teacher transitions. They find evidence that
opportunity wages affect the probabilities of both entry and exit. These results are consistent with earlier
work by Murnane and Olsen (1989, 1990), which found that opportunity wages affected duration in-5-
teaching in both Michigan and North Carolina. In this paper, differences in alternative wage
opportunities are accounted for by the inclusion of dummy variables for each Texas Education Agency
defined region of Texas and school district fixed effects in some specifications. Because virtually all
teachers in our data possess at least a B.A. and teach elementary school age children, additional
differences in alternative opportunities such as those considered by Dolton and van der Klaauw should
not be very important in this analysis.
Working Conditions (WCd).  Much has been made of the fact that there is more to a teaching job than just
the overall salary or compensation levels.  Some of the earliest work considered how teacher preferences
might affect the selection of schools (Greenberg and McCall 1974; Murnane 1981).  More generally,
teachers might be willing to take lower salaries to obtain better conditions in their schools, a proposition
first found in Antos and Rosen (1975) and subsequently pursued in a variety of other analyses (e.g.,
Baugh and Stone 1982; Hanushek and Luque 2000).  Some have interpreted the push for lower class
sizes by teachers as reflecting an element of teacher compensation, as opposed to an educational policy
designed to improve student achievement (cf. Grissmer and Kirby 1992).
If differences in working conditions are not accounted for and they are correlated with salaries,
estimates of the relationship between teacher transitions and salaries will confound salary influences with
those of other factors that affect teacher labor supply. For example, if salaries are higher in urban
districts and teachers prefer suburban districts, estimates of teacher salary effects on labor supply
confound the impacts of salary and community type unless adequate controls for community type are
included. Loeb and Page (1998) argue that the failure to account for differences in working and labor
market conditions explains why many studies fail to identify the true relationship between achievement
and salaries.
A central element of the empirical analysis here is the description of movements of teachers
across different types of schools and student populations in order to study the preferences of teachers and-6-
the form in which compensating wage differentials are played out. Four measures of student
characteristics that may be related to teacher labor supply are included: percent low income, percent
black, percent Hispanic, and average student achievement score. Whether these specific characteristics
directly affect teacher decisions or they serve as proxies for other factors cannot be determined. In any
case the estimates will identify those schools that experience the greatest difficulties in teacher labor
markets.
Personnel Policies. While the relationship between salaries and employment is observed, it is not
possible to infer a priori that the relationship is a “supply function” for teachers. Rather district hiring
and retention practices are an important element in the labor market for teachers. This issue, made
forcefully in a set of recent analyses (Ballou and Podgursky 1995, 1997 and Ballou 1996), is very
important because it frames the interpretation of movements observed in the market. For example, the
observation that retention and salaries are negatively related (controlling for all compensating
differentials) is consistent with a positively sloped supply curve and a positive relationship between
salaries and the probability that districts will not rehire teachers.
In this paper we describe changes in salary for district switchers in addition to the analysis of the
probability teachers exit schools. The fact that we do not observed whether a teacher’s actions are
initiated by the teacher or the district does affect the interpretation of the results.  It is doubtful that pay
increases or improvements in non-pecuniary factors would be as large for involuntary as for voluntary
job changers, therefore the observed changes in salaries and other characteristics for school changers
should understate the gains of those who choose to change schools. Similarly, the link between the
probability of quitting and salaries should be more negative than that between the probability of being
fired and salaries; again the estimated link between quitting and salaries should underestimate the supply
relationship.     
4Many special education and limited English proficient students are exempted from the tests, as are other
students for whom the test would not be educationally appropriate. In each year roughly 15 percent of students do
not take the tests, either because of an exemption or because of repeated absences on testing days. 
     
5Reading and math tests each contain approximately 50 questions, although the number of questions and
average percent correctly answered varies across time and grades.  We transform all test results into standardized
scores with a mean of zero and variance equal to one for each grade and year.  Thus, our achievement measures
describe students in terms of their relative position in the overall state performance distribution.
-7-
The Texas Database
The ability to understand the character and outcomes of teacher labor market activities derives
from the unique data base developed under the UTD Texas Schools Project.  Working with the Texas
Education Agency (TEA), this project has combined different data sources to compile matched panel
data sets on students and teachers. The samples contain the universe of Texas public school teachers in
each year along with entire cohorts of Texas students that permit accurate descriptions of the schools of
each teacher’s employment.
The Public Education Information Management System, TEA’s state-wide educational data base,
reports key demographic data including race, ethnicity and gender for both students and teachers as well
as student eligibility for a subsidized lunch.  It also contains detailed annual information on teacher
experience, salary, education, class size, grade, population served and subject. Importantly, this data base
can be merged with information on both student and teacher achievement. Beginning in 1993, the Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) was administered each spring to eligible students enrolled in
grades three through eight.
4 These criterion referenced tests, which evaluate student mastery of grade-
specific subject matter, are merged with the student and teacher information.
5
Empirical salary schedules are constructed for each school district using the teacher microdata
for the years 1993 to 1996. Emphasis on district schedules reflects our interest in the effects of shifts in
salary schedules.  Each district’s constructed salary schedule corresponds to the median salary of primary
school teachers for the first ten single years of experience for all regular teachers without advanced     
6The panel data provide the opportunity to detect and correct errors in ways not generally possible in prior
work.  We first employ median salaries because of concerns about coding errors leading to extreme values in
salary.  Further, we examined each district that experienced nominal median salary decreases either over time at
any level of experience or across higher experience categories in any given year. We excluded individual teachers
whose salary observations appeared to be unreflective of base salaries, but, if it was not possible to detect obvious
errors, the district/experience/year cell was coded as missing.  There was also substantial error in the teacher
experience variable, exemplified by inconsistencies in reported experience for individual teachers tracked
annually. If a single year did not conform to an otherwise consistent string for an individual teacher, reported
experience for that year was changed. Otherwise, reported experience was left unchanged. Error was also
introduced by inconsistencies in district adjustments for part time teachers, and obvious mistakes were corrected. 
The cells for graduate degrees and for years of experience above ten become too thin in many districts to provide
reliable salary information.  
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degrees.  The detailed panel data for each district and for individual teachers permit an unusual
opportunity to address concerns about measurement error.
6
The salary information excludes a variety of special pay provisions for individual teachers.
Districts offer a variety of individual extra pay opportunities, generally involving extra duties.  Over 85
percent of the observed teachers receive no extra pay, and the median for those receiving it is
approximately $1,000.  (Given the errors in reporting the salary data, however, our base pay measure may
well include some portion of extra pay).  While we do not address these issues here, it is possible that
some districts regularly and openly reward individual teachers or groups of teachers through extra pay
channels.  In such a case, extra pay may provide additional incentives affecting labor market behavior. 
For 90 percent of all districts, less than a quarter of all teachers receive any extra pay.  Nonetheless, for
3½ percent of the Texas districts, over half of the teachers receive some extra pay.
Teacher Mobility, Salaries and Student Demographics
While teacher quality is known to be a primary determinant of student achievement, there is
substantial uncertainty about the leverage that a school district has to improve the stock and performance
of its teachers through compensation, class size and other non-pecuniary job characteristics. We begin
with an analysis of the patterns of teacher moves in order to sort out the relative attractiveness of
different districts.-9-
Transitions Between and Within Districts (1993-96)
A primary goal of our mobility analyses is to sort out the separate influences of salary and other
determinants of job attractiveness. Teachers are observed moving within districts, between districts, and
out of Texas public schools entirely annually between 1993 and 1996.  Importantly, we have information
about salaries and student characteristics for both the sending and receiving schools for each transition.
Overall on an annual basis 79 percent of teachers remain in the same school,  14 percent exit
Texas public schools, 4 percent change schools within districts, and 3 percent switch districts each year. 
This mobility is somewhat higher than national averages which indicate that 86 percent of all teachers
remained in the same school, while only 6.6 percent left teaching between 1994 and 1995 (U.S.
Department of Education, 1997).  Part of the discrepancy is explicable.  Our calculations for exiting from
Texas public schools include people leaving teaching plus people teaching either in private schools or
outside of the state. Moreover, the rapid growth over this period of the Texas student population and the
Texas economy in general undoubtedly influence teacher movements.
Similar to job turnover patterns for the labor market as a whole, transitions differ sharply by
teacher experience.   Table 1 indicates that mobility is much higher among probationary teachers (0-2
years of experience), who are almost twice as likely as prime age teachers (11-30 years experience) to
exit Texas public schools and over four times as likely to switch districts. As expected, mobility picks up
again as teachers near retirement age, and almost one-fourth of teachers with over thirty years of
experience leave the Texas public schools each year. The national patterns of mobility across experience
categories do follow a similar pattern to that in Texas.
The pattern of moves tends to contradict the conventional wisdom that large urban districts are
the proving ground for teachers, who move to suburban jobs when possible.  Table 2, restricted to those
changing districts, provides only weak support for the belief that teachers commonly leave urban districts
for suburban positions. Among teachers in large urban districts, most of those switching districts relocate-10-
to suburban schools, but overall less than two percent of teachers in large urban schools switch districts
in each year. The absolute number moving into urban districts is only slightly smaller than the number
moving out.  During this period the share of Texas teachers in urban districts increased, implying that the
small net outflow of teachers from urban districts is not simply a reflection of changes in the distribution
of teaching positions across community types.
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that a very similar pattern of movement holds for the sub-
sample of probationary teachers, where again the net outflow from urban districts is small. Overall,
probationary urban teachers are only one percentage point less likely to remain in the same school as
probationary suburban teachers (71 versus 72 percent), and this is an identical gap to that for teachers of
all experience levels. Two significant differences between new teachers starting in urban and starting in
suburban districts do exist: Probationary urban teachers are roughly 3.5 percentage points more likely to
exit teaching than those in suburban districts (not shown), while probationary suburban teachers are
somewhat more likely simply to switch schools within districts.
Movement from rural districts follows a very distinct pattern.  The majority of movers goes to a
different rural district.  Significantly fewer rural teachers move to urban districts than is the case for
teachers initially in urban or suburban districts.
These aggregate transition rates among community types provide no information on the actual
changes in salary and student composition. Tables 3, 4 and 5 report in increasing detail the relationship
between pre-move and post-move salaries and student characteristics for teachers who switch schools
and districts.  Each table concentrates on how the average of specific characteristics (C) change with a
move from district d to district d', calculated across all teachers who move as





' () =−     
7Because women are more likely to be married or have children than men of the same age, the smaller gains of
women may reflect the fact that more transitions are precipitated by family considerations. However, we have no
information on reason for moving or family status.
     
8We present the analysis in terms of teacher experience, but tenure within the district may also have separate
implications for salary and other factors that affect satisfaction and mobility.
     
9The achievement score is the average of math and reading scores. These regressions explain about 60 percent
of the raw variance in log salaries, and the district student characteristics are significantly related to salaries. 
Standard errors in the tables have not been adjusted for the fact that these are residuals.
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where year t is the first year in the new district.  In other words, ∆C is the change in characteristics
between sending and receiving schools calculated in the year of move.
The salary changes are computed by single years of experience. For example, the salary change
for a moving teacher with four years of experience equals the district average salary of 5th year teachers
in the new district minus the district average salary of 5th year teachers in the old district, both calculated
in the year of the change. Because consistent salary schedule information is only available for teachers
with ten or fewer years of experience, all teachers with more experience are excluded from these tables. 
(Roughly three-fourths of teachers switching districts have less than 10 years of experience).
Table 3 reports change in salaries and district average student demographic characteristics by
experience and gender.  The top panel indicates that on average probationary teachers who move improve
their salaries relative to what they would have earned in the initial district. Men gain 1.4 percent in salary
with a move, while women gain half that amount.
7  The average salary gain declines with experience, and
the difference is statistically insignificant for more experienced teachers.
8 The gain averaged across all
movers with less than ten years of experience is 0.4 percent of annual salary at the time of the move.
Because compensating differentials could conceal the true change in salary holding other factors
constant, we attempt to control for other determinants of teacher labor supply. Log salary at each
experience level is regressed on 19 region dummies, 3 community type dummies, the district average
achievement score, and the district average percentages of Black, Hispanic and low income students.
9     
10The residual salaries control for interregional price differences but not for intraregional differences such as
commonly observed housing price gradients.  Thus, these estimates quite likely understate the fully compensated
differences in salary.
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The residuals from these regressions provide salary measures adjusted for differences in working
conditions, amenities and local labor markets.  Consistent with the existence of compensating
differentials, the second row of Table 3 shows that average adjusted salaries increase by 50 percent more
than raw salaries (0.6 percent versus 0.4 percent), though there is substantial variation in the pattern of
results across experience and gender. 
In contrast to the modest changes in salary, the bottom panel of Table 3 provides strong evidence
that teachers systematically favor higher achieving, non-minority, non-low income students. The findings
for achievement are the clearest and most consistent across gender and experience categories, showing
that the district average achievement rises by roughly .08 standard deviations, or three percentile points
on the state distribution, for the average mover. The percentages black, Hispanic and eligible for a
subsidized lunch also decline significantly for movers.  Although there is variation across experience
categories, black and Hispanic compositions of districts decline by 2.5 and 5 percent, respectively, and
the percent eligible for free or reduced lunch falls by 6.6 percent.
The average changes, however, mask considerable heterogeneity, some of which appears to be
systematically related to origin and destination community types. For example, the strongest support for
presence of compensating differentials comes from teachers who move among urban and suburban
districts. Table 4, which characterizes moves by different types, shows that teachers who move from
large urban to suburban schools experience average nominal salary losses of 0.65 percent but average
adjusted salary increases of 1.4 percent.
10  Similarly, the adjusted salary increase is three times as large
as the raw salary increase for teachers who switch among suburban districts.
Similar to the pattern for salaries, Table 4 reveals dramatic changes in district average student
characteristics for teachers who move from urban to suburban districts, including a 0.35 standard-13-
deviation (14 percentile) rise in average achievement and falls in racial and ethnic concentrations of 15-
20 percent.  Perhaps more surprising, teachers who move among suburban districts also experience
similar, albeit smaller, changes in student characteristics than found in the urban-suburban moves:
district average achievement rises by more than one tenth of a standard deviation, and the percentages
Black, Hispanic and eligible for a subsidized lunch all decline.
The right hand side of Table 4 calculates the changes in campus average student characteristics
rather than district averages. Changes in campus characteristics provide information on the extent to
which district switchers tend to move to schools in particular parts of the district achievement or student
demographic distributions. These changes also highlight any systematic changes in student
characteristics for teachers who switch schools within districts.
There is little evidence from Table 4 that teachers who move from urban to suburban districts
experience changes that exceed the differential between district averages.  In other words, urban-
suburban movers appear to retain their same relative position in the two districts. On the other hand,
teachers who move within urban districts experience a substantial increase in average achievement and a
decline in percent minority and percent eligible for a subsidized lunch. Those who choose to switch
schools within urban districts appear to seek out schools with fewer academically and economically
disadvantaged students.  These patterns are consistent with the frequently hypothesized placement of new
teachers in the most difficult teaching situations within urban districts coupled with an ability to change
locations as they move up the experience ranks (cf. Raymond, Fletcher, and Luque 2001).
An important question is whether teacher preferences differ systematically on the basis of race,
ethnicity or other factors. Specifically, while the typical transition increases average student achievement
and reduces percent economically disadvantaged and percent nonwhite, there may be substantial
differences among black, Hispanic and white teachers.     
11We look at annual changes, but Kain and Singleton (1996) show that these moving patterns accumulate and
interact with new hiring to produce significant differences in teacher characteristics for Black and white students,
even across campuses within individual districts.
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Table 5 shows distinct differences in the transition patterns of black and Hispanic teachers. Black
teachers tend to move to schools with higher black enrollment shares than the schools they left,
regardless of whether or not they change districts.  On the other hand, the average change in percent
Hispanic for Hispanic teachers is quite similar in direction and magnitude to the changes experienced by
teachers as a whole.
11   In addition, the change in average test scores is much smaller for black and
Hispanic teachers. 
It is difficult to disentangle the possible underlying mechanisms for this race/ethnic pattern in
mover outcomes.  It may reflect differences in teacher preferences, or it may emanate from very different
preferences for factors related to race or ethnicity. For example, if there is extensive residential
segregation and teachers prefer to work closer to where they live, blacks may rank predominantly black
schools much more highly than Hispanic and white colleagues, other things equal. 
Of course differences by teacher ethnicity may not be driven entirely by teacher preferences.
There is no way to quantify the extent to which district personnel policies contribute to the systematic
differences observed in Table 5.  For example, if school and district opportunities for black teachers were
dependent on their willingness to teach in schools with higher proportions of black students, patterns
such as these could easily result.
To summarize the effects on students, Table 6 reports simple school average transition rates at
different points in the distribution of school and district characteristics. The table shows that teachers in
schools in the top quartile of adjusted salaries are 3 percentage points less likely to exit the public
schools and almost 1 percentage point less likely to switch districts than teachers in the bottom quartile
schools.     
12Note that a portion of the observed differential could reflect the fact that schools with a lot of teachers exiting
tend to have more probationary teachers (who on average do worse in the classroom).  The magnitude to these
effects, however, is insufficient to lead to the overall results here (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2001).
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The most dramatic differences in school transition rates are related to student achievement.
Teacher transition rates for schools in the bottom achievement quartile are much higher than those in the
top quartile. Over 25 percent of teachers in the bottom quartile schools leave each year, while in the top
quartile schools less than 20 percent leave. The largest difference is in the probability of exiting public
schools entirely. These differences imply that the lowest achieving students are more likely to 
have teachers new to the school and to the profession, and evidence from Texas strongly suggests that
this will adversely affect achievement (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2001).
12
Transition Regressions
The previous descriptive information on moves does not take into account the joint effects of the
various influences.  Table 7 presents reduced form estimates for linear probability models of the
probability of leaving a district (either switching districts or exiting from the Texas public schools) as a
function of the combined teacher and district characteristics.  Separate estimates are computed by
experience categories in order to allow for differences in preferences, family circumstances and job
security. In particular, those at higher experience levels have chosen for the most part to remain in their
current district for a number of years regardless of district characteristics, which would tend to reduce the
link between transition probabilities and the included district characteristics. In addition, the estimated
relationship between transitions and percentages black and Hispanic are allowed to vary by teacher race
and ethnicity.
The specifications producing the top panel estimates do not include district fixed effects,
meaning that most of the variation in salary and other characteristics comes from differences between
districts. In contrast, the specification for the bottom panel includes district fixed effects. Therefore these
estimates are identified by differences across time in salary and other factors within districts. By-16-
eliminating the unobserved differences in other determinants of teacher labor supply that may be
correlated with the included covariates, the fixed effect specifications are much more likely to identify
the link between the probability of exit and the included characteristics.
The baseline non-fixed effect estimates are qualitatively similar to the previously presented
univariate statistics. Higher salaries reduce the probability of exiting a district, and the magnitude of the
effect tends to decline with experience. The transition rate is also significantly related to a number of
student characteristics including average achievement, percent black and percent Hispanic. Higher
average student achievement significantly reduces the probability of moving or exiting Texas public
schools at all levels of experience.  Non-black or Hispanic teachers are more likely to transition the
higher are the Black and Hispanic enrollment shares, although the only significant effects are related to
percent black students for younger teachers.  Exactly the opposite is true for black and Hispanic teachers,
who are less likely to transition the higher the minority enrollment shares. There is little evidence of an
independent effect of percent eligible for a subsidized lunch.  Finally, (not shown) there is little or no
evidence that the probability of moving or exiting is systematically related to average class size in any
specification, raising doubts about the frequently hypothesized impact of smaller classes on teacher
decisions.
The bottom panel reports results for models with district fixed-effects that remove the influence
of any time invariant district factors. A comparison of the top and bottom panels demonstrates the
importance of controlling for such unobserved variables. In particular, the student racial and ethnic
composition coefficients for non-black, non-Hispanic teachers change markedly. Now it becomes clear
that increases in the campus proportion of students who are Hispanic or black raises the probability of
exiting for these teachers, although similar to the other variables the effects tend to decline with     
13The inclusion of fixed effects also raises the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on eligibility for a
subsidized lunch, but the direction of the effect is inconsistent with a labor supply story in which teachers prefer
districts with higher income children. More likely, the negative relationship for subsidized lunch reflects institutional
changes at schools related to Texas school finance reform efforts. Schools with less wealthy student populations
experienced revenue increases during this period, money which may have been used to make teaching more
attractive (in ways not measured here).
     
14Salary may have a much different effect on the retirement decisions for the small number of teachers with more
than thirty years of experience than on the decisions of younger teachers.
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experience. In comparison the inclusion of district fixed effects has little impact on the estimates for
black and Hispanic teachers.
13
In terms of the salary variable, the estimated effect for probationary teachers falls by roughly two
thirds in magnitude following the inclusion of the fixed effects, while the estimates for teachers with six
to ten years of experience increases by more than a factor of three. While the fixed effect results alone do
not provide strong evidence in favor of the belief that teachers respond to salary, the consistently
negative coefficients for teachers with less than thirty years of experience in combination with a similar
and much more significant set of findings in the non-fixed effect specifications support the belief that
higher salaries reduce exits.
14 It is quite plausible that the small salary variations across time provide a
noisy measure of the longer term salary shifts that would affect decisions to quit or change schools,
particularly because base year salary is a noisy representation of the entire salary structure.
Finally, the estimated effects of average student test score on the probability of leaving a district
tend to fall slightly (15 to 20 percent in general) following the inclusion of the fixed effects. It appears
that some other characteristic of districts is correlated with student average achievement and teacher
transitions.
The estimates reported in Table 7 restrict the effects of salary, student and classroom
characteristics to have the same effects on the probability of switching schools as on the probability of
leaving the Texas public schools entirely. It may be the case, however, that variable effects differ for
these two transitions. In particular, teachers knowledgeable of the generally low level of salaries in the-18-
profession may be much more sensitive to salary differences among districts than between teaching and
other alternatives. Consequently we divide district leavers into those who move to a new district and
those who exit the Texas public schools entirely and estimate multinomial logit specifications. Again
separate estimates are computed for the five experience categories.
The results in Table 8 indicate that teacher salary is much more strongly related to the probability
of switching districts (relative to remaining) than to the probability of exiting the Texas public schools.
This salary sensitivity for district moves holds across all experience groupings.  In contrast, student
achievement appears to be a much more important determinant of the probability of exiting schools.
Teaching lower achieving students – whether because teachers find it more difficult or less rewarding –
is strong factor in decisions to leave Texas public schools, and the magnitude of the effect holds across
the full range of teacher experience.
As seen previously, teaching in racially concentrated districts has a strong effect on both the
probability of leaving the public schools entirely and on the probability of switching districts. For white
teachers, the influence on switching districts remains across the experience distribution, while the
influence on exiting the public schools is concentrated in the earlier years.  For black teachers, the
reactions to varying concentrations of black students is almost exactly the opposite that for whites in both
sign and magnitude. 
Conclusions
The results in this paper confirm the difficulty that schools serving academically disadvantaged
students have in retaining teachers, particularly those early in their careers. There is also strong evidence
that non-black, non-Hispanic teachers systematically prefer non-black, non-Hispanic students, while the
opposite appears to be the case for black and Hispanic teachers. These findings conform to the widely
publicized teacher shortages plaguing many of the nation’s inner city schools.     
15The ability to attract minority teachers over time has diminished (National Center for Education Statistics
2000) and has been the subject of previous attention to teacher supply (Murnane et al., 1991; Hanushek and Pace
1995).
-19-
A key issue is the magnitude of the additional compensation required to offset the disadvantages
some schools must overcome in order to compete for teachers. We examined the possibility that the
impact of salaries varied with student characteristics and the possibility that the effects of student
characteristics were non-linear. We found little or no evidence of such non-linearities, therefore the
salary coefficients in the tables provide the best estimates of the compensating differentials needed to
offset the labor market disadvantages of certain schools.
The estimates indicate that higher salaries reduce the probability that teachers leave a district,
and the magnitude of this effect tends to be fairly similar across the experience spectrum with a range
from -0.1 to -0.3, implying that a ten percent salary increase (between two and three thousand dollars per
year depending upon the district) would reduce exits by at most three percent. By comparison, a one
standard deviation decrease in school average achievement increases the probability of exiting by
between one and two percent, and a ten percent increase in the percentage of students who are black or
Hispanic raises the probability that non-black, non-Hispanic teachers exit by an additional one to two
percent. Consequently, schools serving a high proportion of students who are academically very
disadvantaged and either black or Hispanic may have to pay an additional 20, 30 or even 50 percent more
in salary than those schools serving a predominantly white or Asian, academically well-prepared student
body. Of course the availability of black or hispanic teachers may substantially reduce the costs of hiring
for these schools.
15
Importantly, the pattern of multinomial logit estimates suggests that across the board salary
increases are unlikely to compensate for the labor market disadvantages facing some schools. It appears
that salaries relative to other districts rather than the absolute level of teacher salaries is the important
factor, as salaries appear to have a larger impact on the probability of switching districts rather than-20-
exiting teaching altogether. Of course the absolute level of salaries may affect the number of prospective
teachers, but that is beyond the scope of this work.
An alternative to raising salaries is the abatement of the disadvantage associated with particular
types of students. If the results capture teacher preferences for student race or ethnicity then districts
possess few policy options. But these estimates may well proxy for other factors such as safety or travel
time to work related to these characteristics. In addition, improvements in academic preparation through
better preschools or child care services may well have the indirect benefit of making schools more
appealing to prospective teachers. Learning more about the precise sources of the relationship between
teacher labor supply and the specific student characteristics would provide important, policy relevant
information.
Finally, this paper focuses solely on the quantity of teacher transitions with little or no attention
paid to quality. The actual cost of improving the quality of instruction depends crucially on the details of
district hiring, retention and other personnel policies. Ballou (1997) raises serious doubts that districts
systematically hire the best candidates available, suggesting that instructional quality could be improved
at little or no cost in terms of higher salary. The extent to which better personnel policies would merely
reallocate teachers among schools rather than raise the overall average level of instruction is an
extremely important issue that merits further research.-21-
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Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, no. 2 (May 1985): 409-46.Table 1.  Year-to-year Transitions of Teachers by Experience, 1993-1996 
Percent of Teachers Who
Teacher














0-2 years 71.2  5.0  5.8  18.0  73,261 
3-5 years 75.1  4.8  4.1  15.9  55,072 
6-10 years 79.2  4.6  2.8  13.5  60,831 
11-30 years 84.0  3.9  1.4  10.8  166,487 
>30 years 72.8  2.4  0.4  24.4  7,207 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 6.  School Average Transition Rates by Distribution of Residual Teacher Salary and






















lowest 4.4% 3.4% 17.4%
2nd 3.8% 3.6% 15.0%
3rd 3.2% 3.0% 14.1%
highest 3.3% 2.5% 12.7%
% elig for free lunch
lowest 3.8% 2.3% 12.8%
2nd 3.0% 3.3% 14.7%
3rd 3.4% 3.7% 15.0%
highest 4.7% 3.0% 16.6%
% Black
lowest 3.4% 3.6% 16.2%
2nd 3.7% 2.7% 13.4%
3rd 3.6% 2.8% 13.6%
highest 4.1% 3.3% 15.8%
% Hispanic
lowest 3.3% 3.1% 14.1%
2nd 3.8% 3.1% 14.3%
3rd 3.5% 3.2% 14.7%
highest 4.3% 3.1% 16.5%
Note:  The quartile divisions are calculated using the number of teachers as weights for the size of each school.
Differences in average class sizes imply that these weights do not exactly capture enrollment differences, but data
on enrollment were not available for all schools in all years.Table 7. Estimated Effects of Starting Teacher Salary and Student Demographic
Characteristics on the Probability that Teachers Leave School Districts, by
Experience 
(linear probability models with and without district fixed effects, absolute value of
huber-white adjusted t statistics in parentheses)
Experience
0-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-30 yrs >30 years
1. No District Fixed Effects
log first year -0.26 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09 0.10
salary (6.40) (2.94) (1.50) (2.74) (0.63)
Campus Average Student Characteristics
Test Score -0.035 -0.042 -0.045 -0.033 -0.053
(3.85) (4.63) (5.13) (5.16) (1.91)
% elig. for 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01
subs lunch (0.18) (1.49) (0.16) (1.15) (0.13)
% Black 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.09
(5.49) (3.59) (1.23) (0.86) (1.41)
% Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.07
(1.32) (1.73) (0.06) (0.43) (1.06)
Interactions
Black * -0.26 -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 0.08
% Black (7.31) (4.84) (3.88) (5.14) (1.34)
Black * -0.14 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.10
% Hispanic (3.49) (1.01) (2.31) (4.09) (1.62)
Hispanic * -0.15 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.38
% Black (3.33) (0.81) (0.61) (2.11) (1.68)
Hispanic * -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.07
% Hispanic (4.56) (2.93) (2.52) (3.65) (0.76)Table 7 (continued)
Experience
0-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-30 yrs >30 years
2. District Fixed Effects
log base year -0.09 -0.14 -0.20 -0.15 0.22
salary (1.14) (1.20) (1.97) (1.60) (0.65)
Campus Average Student Characteristics
Test Score -0.029 -0.034 -0.040 -0.029 -0.061
(2.99) (3.60) (4.45) (4.09) (2.23)
% elig. for -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07
subs lunch (2.72) (3.34) (2.76) (0.51) (0.97)
% Black 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.06 -0.09
(7.78) (5.94) (5.85) (5.26) (1.11)
% Hispanic 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.04 -0.03
(3.60) (3.93) (4.17) (2.47) (0.40)
Interactions
Black * -0.27 -0.19 -0.11 -0.07 0.12
% Black (7.44) (4.88) (4.10) (4.93) (1.65)
Black * -0.15 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.08
% Hispanic (3.54) (0.97) (2.46) (4.82) (1.15)
Hispanic * -0.16 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.27
% Black (3.78) (1.49) (1.57) (2.47) (1.08)
Hispanic * -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01
% Hispanic (5.04) (2.90) (2.67) (4.45) (0.12)
Observations 57,833 42,492 55,931 125,936 5,457Table 8. Multinomial Logit Estimated Effects of Teacher Salary and Student Demographic
Characteristics on the Probabilities that Teachers Switch School Districts or Exit Teaching 
(absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; remaining in the same district is the numeraire)
Experience
0-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-30 yrs >30 years
Switch
Districts
log base year -2.05 -2.10 -1.88 -1.59 -2.87
salary (6.00) (4.54) (3.90) (3.53) (0.65)
Campus Average Student Characteristics
Test Score -0.05 -0.40 -0.11 -0.15 -1.74
(0.66) (3.80) (0.93) (1.33) (2.10)
% elig. for 0.49 -0.06 0.27 0.41 0.50
subs lunch (3.06) (0.31) (1.17) (1.87) (0.30)
% Black 1.02 0.84 0.83 0.88 -1.26
(6.35) (3.69) (3.33) (3.57) (0.61)
% Hispanic 0.10 0.49 0.26 0.19 -0.99
(0.60) (2.12) (1.02) (0.78) (0.48)
Interactions
Black * -2.79 -1.67 -2 -2.21 4.08
% Black (6.98) (2.91) (3.83) (5.24) (0.58)
Black * -1.31 -0.11 -0.49 -1.62 2.82
% Hispanic (2.93) (0.20) (0.97) (3.65) (0.35)
Hispanic * -1.37 -1 -0.87 -0.02 -1.25
% Black (3.25) (1.70) (1.22) (0.03) (0.22)
Hispanic * -1.15 -1.06 -0.70 -0.81 -1.77
% Hispanic (5.44) (4.01) (2.12) (2.70) (0.76)Table 8 (continued)
Experience
0-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-30 yrs >30 years
Exit Teaching
log base year -1.22 -0.55 -0.06 -0.67 0.62
salary (5.50) (2.07) (0.24) (3.60) (0.91)
Campus Average Student Characteristics
Test Score -0.25 -0.24 -0.40 -0.36 -0.28
(5.39) (4.08) (7.20) (8.77) (2.14)
% elig. for -0.18 -0.27 -0.15 0.23 -0.06
subs lunch (1.93) (2.36) (1.34) (2.83) (0.22)
% Black 0.59 0.45 0.13 0.13 -0.51
(5.88) (3.49) (1.04) (1.44) (1.46)
% Hispanic 0.24 0.27 0.01 -0.08 -0.35
(2.34) (2.11) (0.11) (0.83) (1.12)
Interactions
Black * -1.20 -1.10 -0.64 -0.58 0.49
% Black (5.95) (4.21) (2.77) (4.29) (1.31)
Black * -0.74 -0.29 -0.43 -0.48 0.56
% Hispanic (3.18) (1.02) (1.73) (3.42) (1.61)
Hispanic * -0.53 0.06 -0.08 -0.71 2.27
% Black (1.92) (0.16) (0.23) (2.46) (1.56)
Hispanic * -0.43 -0.24 -0.46 -0.61 0.52
% Hispanic (2.87) (1.34) (2.65) (4.83) (0.84)Appendix Table A1.  Descriptive Statistics — Means and Standard Deviations
4th Grade 5th Grade
Achievement Gains
Math -0.02 0.01 
(0.65) (0.59) 
Reading -0.03 0.01 
(0.67) (0.63) 
Log District Salary
0 yrs experience 10.00 10.00 
(0.11) (0.10) 
Teacher Experience Distribution
% 0 years 6.2  5.7 
%1 year 5.8  5.8 
% 2 years 5.1  5.6 
% 3-4 years 11.7  10.8 
% 5-9 years 21.4  19.7 
% 10-19 years 30.9  31.0 
% 21-30 years 16.4  18.6 
% > 30 years 2.5  2.8 
Teacher Transition Distribution from Prior Year
% same campus & grade 67.6  66.8 
% same campus, different grade 12.8  11.6 
% different campus, same district 4.2  5.6 
% different district 3.6  3.3 
% not in Texas public schools 11.7  12.7 
Student Demographic Characteristics
% Black 14.1  14.0 
(20.4) (20.4) 
% Hispanic 31.0  31.0 
(30.0) (30.2) 
% Eligible for subsidized lunch 46.8  46.7 
(27.1) (27.0) 